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strategy, operations, and the margin of victory
Dov S. Zakheim
Margin of Victory: Five Battles That Changed the Face of 
Modern War, by Douglas Macgregor. Foreword by Robert 
M. Citrino. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2016. 288 
pages. $34.95.
Douglas Macgregor, a decorated Army tank commander who has gone on to be-
come a leading iconoclastic—and prescient—military intellectual, has produced 
an ambitious evaluation of five key twentieth-century battles and the strategic 
and operational assumptions that led up to them. Margin of Victory examines in 
great yet readable detail the strategic 1914 battle of Mons and the strategic with-
drawal that followed it; the 1937 Japanese battle for Shanghai; the 1944 Soviet 
destruction of the Wehrmacht’s Army Group Center in and around the Belorus-
sian swamps; the Israeli counterattack across the Suez in the 1973 Yom Kippur 
War; and the crushing American defeat of Saddam Hussein’s forces in the 1991 
battle of 73 Easting. Taken together, Macgregor argues, these battles have much to 
offer those who formulate contemporary American strategy and plan its military 
operations. Indeed, he goes further: those who ignore the lessons of these battles 
do so at their peril. As he states in his introductory paragraph, “Hell . . . can be 
defined in three words: defeat in war. Margin of Victory is about avoiding hell.”
Macgregor devotes a chapter to each of the five major battles he has chosen as 
object lessons for current civilian and military policy makers. His account of the 
battle of Mons is actually a panegyric to Richard Haldane, Britain’s secretary of state 
for war from 1905 to 1912. Facing unstinting opposition from a hidebound officer 
corps wedded to operational concepts that had failed miserably in the Boer War 
and confronting budget constraints that prioritized the modernization of the Royal 
Navy, Haldane nevertheless managed to create a general staff, transform the army 
into a capable expeditionary force, organize a trained reserve, emphasize realistic 
training, and inaugurate a regimen of professional military education. His reforms, 
Macgregor states, would be called today “disruptive innovation.” As a result, the 
seriously outnumbered British Expeditionary Force was able both to force the in-
vading German forces to alter their plans for the at-
tack on Paris and to slow them sufficiently to enable 
the Allies to mount the defenses that stopped the 
attackers at the battle of the Marne, thereby prevent-
ing an attack on the French capital. As Macgregor 
concludes, “by the standards of the early twentieth 
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century, Haldane’s reforms achieved miracles.” They also prevented what other-
wise might have been a quick German victory in what became known as World 
War I.
Macgregor’s account of the battle of Shanghai is essentially a discussion of 
what happens when a modernizer’s efforts are ignored or overridden. General 
Kazushige Ugaki, Japanese minister of war from 1924 to 1927 and 1929 to 1931, 
identified the Soviet Union as Japan’s primary potential adversary and recognized 
that, as Macgregor puts it, “in the future the IJA [Imperial Japanese Army] would 
need the mobility and firepower to conduct sweeping flank attacks, enveloping 
or encircling the Russian enemy.”
Ugaki also challenged the prevailing Japanese view that budgetary priority 
should be assigned to naval force modernization and expansion. Few of his re-
forms to realize his objectives outlasted his terms in office, however. As a result, 
Japan conducted a bloody and far too costly campaign to seize Shanghai from 
Chiang Kai-shek’s more numerous but vastly outgunned and poorly trained 
troops, only succeeding thanks to firepower support from Japanese naval and 
air forces. Japan then successfully conquered eastern and southern China, but, 
as Macgregor points out, “Japan’s war with China not only delayed and disrupted 
the IJA’s modernization; it also fatally crippled Japan’s northern strategy to defeat 
the Soviet Union, while putting Japan on a collision course with Britain and the 
United States. Thus, where Haldane succeeded, at least in part, to the benefit of 
his country’s forces, Ugaki failed completely, to the costly detriment of Imperial 
Japan.”
Ugaki’s failures pale by comparison with the mad strategy that propelled Hitler 
into invading the Soviet Union and then refusing to implement a planned with-
drawal that could have saved huge numbers of his troops. It was true that during 
the 1930s the Germans had increased their tactical fighting power by focusing on 
attacks at the point of impact. Nevertheless, the Soviet military, recovering from 
Stalin’s purges, centrally driven from the top, with unity of command, and indif-
ferent to massive personnel losses, successfully focused on “integrating and con-
centrating combat power on the operational level for strategic effect.” The results 
of Hitler’s mistakes and the Soviet transformation played out in 1944, when the 
Red Army was able to destroy the German Army Group Center. Until it was clear 
all was about to be lost, Hitler vehemently opposed any withdrawal in the face 
of the advancing Soviet troops, insisting that his soldiers “fight to the last man.” 
His generals, many of whom were nonprofessional party hacks, were unable or 
unwilling to challenge his decision. Even when he finally consented to an orga-
nized withdrawal to more-defensible positions, Hitler insisted that forces remain 
behind to defend the various towns from which they had operated. As a result, 
the Soviets were able to bypass what Hitler termed “fortified places,” encircle and 
destroy the retreating army group, and take the towns as well. In Macgregor’s 
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words, the Soviet transformation, encompassing changes in “command structure, 
organization for combat, and supporting doctrine for the application of military 
power in the form of strike—artillery, rockets, and airpower—with operationally 
agile maneuver forces created a margin of victory that changed the course of 
European and world history.”
Macgregor’s fourth case study, that of the Israeli counterattack across the 
Suez Canal, is meant to demonstrate how a culture that fosters flexibility and 
independent initiative and leadership enabled the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) 
to offset intelligence misreadings of Egyptian preparations to cross the canal. He 
also points to Israel’s merit-based promotion system and the IDF’s recognition 
that “one size does not fit all”—in other words, its diversity of capacity. Macgregor 
allows that Ariel Sharon went beyond mere initiative and flagrantly disobeyed 
orders. But Macgregor also notes that Sharon’s admittedly costly efforts to sur-
prise, and contribute to the encirclement of, Egypt’s Third Army were a major 
factor in the success of the Israeli counterattack. Macgregor credits Anwar Sadat 
with the foresight to recognize that only by redeeming Egypt’s honor, which had 
been crushed in the Six-Day War, could Cairo finally achieve peace with Israel, 
one that has stood the test of the region’s endless crises and wars for the better 
part of four decades.
Macgregor led a tank battalion in the battle of 73 Easting, a major American 
triumph in the 1991 war with Saddam Hussein and another source of lessons for 
achieving a “margin of victory.” Macgregor has written about this battle before: in 
2009 he devoted an entire volume, entitled Warrior’s Rage: The Great Tank Battle 
of 73 Easting, to the events of 26–27 February 1991. The book offers an account of 
the actions of the 2nd Squadron of the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment (“Cougar 
Squadron”), which surprised and crushed an Iraqi Republican Guard armored 
brigade by charging out of a sandstorm during Operation DESERT STORM in what 
became the U.S. Army’s largest tank battle since World War II. Macgregor’s pur-
pose in repeating the tale is to argue that President George H. W. Bush ordered a 
cease-fire prematurely, while Norman Schwarzkopf, who commanded Operation 
DESERT STORM, essentially let fifty thousand Republican Guards escape virtually 
unscathed, only to be rearmed by Saddam to fight another day. Macgregor is 
also bitterly critical of the American military’s failure truly to integrate its forces, 
so that the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines continue to seek service self-
sufficiency, at a cost to overall operational effectiveness.
Macgregor’s description of each of the foregoing battles is gripping and fast 
paced. It is unfortunate that the maps that accompany his prose often do not 
include the towns, and at times the rivers, to which he refers, so the reader loses 
track of the tactical ebb and flow of battle. Macgregor’s editors also should have 
ensured a consistent approach to the spelling of towns and other locales whose 
names are central to the battles. For example, at times the book simply misspells 
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names, as in Chongming Island (which Macgregor spells Changming). Macgregor 
also is not consistent in his use of romanized forms of the place-names he cites: 
Chinese place-names employ pinyin, the system introduced by the Communists 
in 1949, although he is writing about battles that took place when the Wade-Giles 
system was still in use. On the other hand, he mentions Cheju-do Island, spelled 
as it was in 1937; the current Korean spelling is Jejudo.
One might quibble with other elements of Macgregor’s history. He writes of 
Field Marshal French’s argument with Lord Kitchener in Paris without explain-
ing when French got there, since French last had been mentioned in the context 
of the battle of Le Cateau. At one point Macgregor erroneously calls Shanghai 
the capital of Nationalist China. He does not mention that Germany was able 
to provision the Wehrmacht with considerable matériel thanks to Jewish, Pol-
ish, and other slave labor. Nor does he mention the diversion of resources from 
Wehrmacht fighting power owing to Hitler’s mad preoccupation with the ex-
termination of Jews, even as the fortunes of war turned against his forces. And 
Macgregor does not note that the fact that Sadat ordered his forces to cross the 
canal on Yom Kippur, when Israelis were preoccupied with the holiest day on 
their religious calendar, certainly contributed to the Egyptians achieving strategic 
and operational surprise.
All told, however, Macgregor has written another powerful critique of the 
American way of planning and developing strategy for war. His lesson for 
policy makers and strategists alike is that “whenever new military concepts and 
technologies appear, the complex interaction of national culture, bureaucratic 
interests, and economic power does not automatically work to support them. . . . 
[W]hen conditions change and the margin of victory suddenly narrows, frailties 
and vulnerabilities concealed from view inside the armed forces . . . suddenly 
produce catastrophic failure.” He asserts that Washington needs to focus on its 
long-standing and still primary strategic concern, namely, prevention of a hostile 
power from dominating the Eurasian lands. He argues that the American military 
must increase its force levels, notably those of the Army. And he advocates for 
the creation of what he terms a “national defense staff ” (in other words, a gen-
eral staff) “to guide the application of American military power,” encompassing 
integrated capabilities across service lines.
Not everyone will agree with Macgregor’s prescriptions. Often he has been a 
lonely voice in the wilderness. Yet as America transitions to a new administra-
tion, it would do well at a minimum to pay close attention to what Macgregor has 
to say. Because one thing is certain: America’s next war certainly will not be like 
those it is fighting today, and those who make the all-too-frequent error of fight-
ing tomorrow’s war with today’s assumptions and experience surely will regret 
doing so, as Macgregor has demonstrated so ably yet again in his latest volume.
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